In their seminal paper on the principal-agent model with moral hazard, Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the agent's utility function is U (I , a) = −e −k (I −a) , then the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action is increasing in the agent's degree of absolute risk aversion. Their proof is restricted to the case where the number of observable outcomes is equal to two, and it uses an argument that is specific to that case. In this note, we provide an alternative proof that generalizes their result to any (finite) number of outcomes.
Introduction
Contracting problems with moral hazard have been widely studied in the economics literature in the last twenty years. The standard paradigm is the principalagent problem, where a risk neutral principal hires a risk averse agent to perform a certain task, but she cannot observe the action the agent takes. The contract is based on an observable stochastic outcome that depends on the agent's action. The basic problem for the principal in this situation is to design a compensation scheme that maximizes her expected profits.
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It is well known that, compared to the first best case with observable actions, there is a nonnegative loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action; i.e., her expected profits are smaller in the presence of moral hazard. However, this loss is zero if the agent is risk neutral.
In their seminal contribution, Grossman and Hart (1983) (henceforth GH) developed a useful two-step methodology to analyze the principal-agent problem when the number of outcomes is finite and the agent's preferences over income lotteries are independent of his actions. Among the numerous important issues addressed in their paper, they considered the following: since there is no incentive problem when the agent is risk neutral, but one exists when he is risk averse, does the loss to the principal increase when the agent becomes more risk averse? They immediately pointed out (GH p. 38) a difficulty in answering this question, namely, that if U (a, I ) is the agent's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that exhibits the aforementioned independence property, then an increasing concave transformation of this function (i.e., making the agent more risk averse) in general won't satisfy this property. In order to avoid this difficulty, they restricted attention to the case where the set of actions is a subset of the real line and U (a, I ) = −e −k (I −a) , k > 0. 1 Assuming a finite number of actions and two outcomes, they were able to show that the loss to the principal is increasing in k ; i.e., the more risk averse the agent is, the more costly is the incentive problem for the principal. The proof relies on an argument that is specific to the two-outcome case.
In this note, we provide an alternative proof that generalizes their result to any (finite) number of outcomes. 2
Preliminaries
The incentive problem faced by the risk neutral principal is denoted by (A, U , U , q, π) , where A is the agent's action set, a finite subset of the real line; U (a, I ) = −e −k (I −a) , k > 0, is the agent's vonNeumann-Morgenstern utility function that depends on his income I and his action a; U = −e −k α is the agent's reservation utility, i.e. if he doesn't work for the principal he can obtain elsewhere a level of (certain) income α; q = (q 1 , ..., q n ) is the set of possible observable outcomes for the principal, q 1 < q 2 < ... < q n ; π(a) = (π 1 (a), ..., π n (a)) is the probability distribution over the outcomes if the agent chooses the action a, and it is assumed that π i (a) > 0 for every a ∈ A and i = 1, ..., n. An incentive scheme is simply
